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Security of automotive systems
 Vehicle systems are increasingly open and 
connected to user devices
 Critical vehicle functions getting automated and the 
driver is outside of the control loop
 Cooperative driving functions depend on 
trustworthiness of external data
 Security is a concern for safety
 Adds new causes to existing hazards
 Adds new hazards
 Privacy concerns 
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Automotive attack surface
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ISO 26262 Road vehicles - Functional safety 
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SAE J3061Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical 
Vehicle Systems 
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TARA
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Threat modeling
 Threat modeling: defining a theoretical model of perceived threats to a 
system. 
 Theoretical model should be as close as possible to the practical 
implementation to capture the significant attack vectors. 
 How to model a system and its trust assumptions?
 How to model an adversary that captures its motivations, capabilities, and 
actions including its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)?
912.01.2017
Our proposal
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4 steps to automotive threat modeling
 Model a system by drawing the system architecture in Data-flow Diagram 
(DFD), adding system details to the elements in the DFD, and draw the trust 
boundaries. 
 Identify threats stemmed from data flows by using a threat identification 
methodology such as STRIDE. An assessment of the severity of the threats 
can be added. 
 Address each threat by redesigning the system, adding mitigation, or 
ignoring it if the risk is acceptable. 
 Validate the threat modeling diagram against actual system and all identified 
threats are addressed. 
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Implementation
1212.01.2017
 Automotive ECU as a communication 
gateway
 Applications
 Remote maintenance
 Remote control similar as in cockpit
 Over-the-Air update
 Based on an existing HMI module, 
which is extended with remote 
connectivity
 Used for off-road and duty vehicles
 Configuration of ECU may impact safety 
(different equipment limits depending on 
model)
 Configuration and software are 
important Intellectual Property
 Remote connection can influence 
operation
DFD
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DFD view
Threat analysis view
Threats generated 
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TARA: threat analysis
Integrity
Availability
Confidentiality
Confidentiality
Confidentiality
Integrity
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Conclusion
 Threat modeling – an effective and practical tool for security analys in 
automotive development lifecycle
 Efficiency, accuracy, and repeatability
 Future work
 Build up threat database
 Connect DFD with SysML
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